The Distribution of Power in Exchange Networks: Theory and Experimental Results by K. S. Cook et al.
The Distribution of Power in Exchange Networks: Theory and Experimental Results
Author(s): Karen S. Cook, Richard M. Emerson, Mary R. Gillmore, Toshio Yamagishi
Source: The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 89, No. 2 (Sep., 1983), pp. 275-305
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2779142
Accessed: 10/12/2010 21:31
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless
you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you
may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.
Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=ucpress.
Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed
page of such transmission.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
The University of Chicago Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The
American Journal of Sociology.
http://www.jstor.orgThe Distribution of Power in Exchange 
Networks: Theory and Experimental Results 
Karen S. Cook, Richard M.  Emerson, Mary R. Gillmore, 
and Toshio Yamagishi 
University of Washington 
This  paper presents a theoretical analysis of the structural deter- 
minants of power in exchange networks, along with research find- 
ings  from laboratory experiments and  a  computer simulation  of 
bargaining in  network  structures. Two  theoretical traditions are 
dealt with: (1) point centrality in graph-theoretic representations of 
structure, as an approach to power distributions; and (2) power- 
dependence principles applied to exchange networks. Measures of 
centrality available  in the literature have  the advantage of being 
easily applied to large and complex networks. In contrast, power- 
dependence concepts were conceived for use in microsociology and 
are found to be cumbersome in the analysis of complex networks. 
But  despite  the  relative  difficulty of  applying power-dependence 
theory to network structures, that approach generates hypotheses 
about power distributions which are confirmed at nearly every point 
in a laboratory experiment with five-person networks and at every 
point in a computer simulation of networks too large for laboratory 
study. In contrast, centrality measures applied to the type of net- 
works studied  fail  to  predict power  distributions. Although  cen- 
trality  measures  might  predict  power  in  some  networks,  their 
generality is limited.  Toward resolution of the issues raised,  this 
study offers two  theoretical points: (1) a distinction between two 
different principles of "connection"  in social networks suggests that 
current measures of centrality might predict power in one type of 
network but not in the other; and (2) it offers a first step toward a 
fusion of power-dependence theory and structural centrality in a 
way which might be general across networks of both types. 
A review of the literature in sociology-and anthropology over the past 15 
years would  show  a  virtual  explosion  in  research dealing  with  social 
networks. This explosion is partially a result of the rapid improvement 
during this time period in the methodology for analyzing network data 
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(see, e.g.,  White, Boorman, and Breiger 1976; White and Breiger 1975; 
Burt  1976).  Theoretical  developments,  however,  have  lagged  behind 
methodological  advances,  so  much  so  that  Granovetter  (1979)  was 
prompted to caution that a "theory gap" exists. One reason for this state 
of affairs is that network methods have not been tied closely to existing 
bodies of sociological theory. More commonly, network properties have 
been examined descriptively (e.g.,  in detailed analyses of particular in- 
dividuals' personal networks) or have  been treated as  variables to  be 
"added to" other sets  of factors in the  explanation of  some  particular 
behavior (e.g.,  voting  behavior, health-seeking behavior). Even the so- 
phisticated techniques developed to render complex data sets analyzable 
(i.e.,  blockmodeling techniques) give us primarily new methods for de- 
tecting social structure, not a "theory of social structure." 
Furthermore, the devices we use to represent networks-such  as points, 
lines, edges, and geodesics-and  the concepts we use to describe network 
properties-such  as density, centrality, and degree of connectedness-are 
devoid  of  specific substantive  meaning.  A  point  can  be  a  person,  an 
organization, or any other entity, and a line can represent anything that 
can occur between two points (e.g.,  a friendship link,  a business trans- 
action,  the  flow  of  information,  influence,  resources, or energy). This 
abstractness has facilitated formal mathematical analysis, for example, 
the development of graph theory (Harary, Norman, and Cartwright 1965); 
but, as Foster (1979), Freeman (1979), and others have suggested, it has 
frequently presented problems in the interpretability of findings. 
In  this  article we  attempt to  articulate theory concerning exchange 
networks with  structural concepts  drawn  from recent work  on  social 
networks. Stimulated by Freeman's (1979) thoughtful essay, we focus on 
centrality and its relation to power in networks of connected exchange 
relations. Using important theoretical distinctions taken from exchange 
theory (Emerson 1972), we demonstrate that in certain types of exchange 
networks existing measures of structural centrality (as identified by Free- 
man 1979) have limited utility in predicting the locus of network power. 
Empirical work of this type can help not only to clarify the link between 
centrality and power but also to identify the limitations of existing mea- 
sures of centrality and to suggest fruitful directions for the development 
of more general theory. First, we introduce relevant theoretical notions; 
then we  describe empirical results and present conclusions concerning 
centrality and the distribution of power in exchange networks. 
EXCHANGE  NETWORKS:  BASIC CONCEPTS 
Many of the social networks of interest to social scientists can be analyzed 
fruitfully as exchange networks, provided that the specific content of the 
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social relations in the network involves the transfer of valued items (i.e., 
the provision of information, affection or approval, advice, or more tan- 
gible things like goods and direct services; see Sarason et al.  [1978] on 
this point). The concept "exchange network" has the theoretical advantage 
of allowing the extension and application of already well-developed dyadic 
conceptions of exchange (e.g.,  Homans 1961, 1974; Emerson 1962, 1972) 
to more macro, N-actor levels of analysis. 
On the basis of Emerson's (1972) earlier work,  an exchange network 
can be defined as consisting of: (1) a set of actors (either natural persons 
or corporate groups), (2) a distribution of valued resources among those 
actors, (3) for each actor a set of exchange opportunities with other actors 
in the network, (4) a set of historically developed and utilized exchange 
opportunities called exchange relations,2 and (5) a set of network con- 
nections linking exchange relations into a single network structure. Thus 
an "exchange network" is a specific social structure formed by two  or 
more connected  exchange  relations between  actors,  with  "connection" 
defined as follows: 
Definition  1:  Two  exchange  relations  between  actors  A-B  and  actors  A-C 
are  connected  to  form  the  minimal  network  B-A-C  to  the  degree  that  ex- 
change  in  one  relation  is  contingent  on  exchange  (or nonexchange)  in  the 
other  relation.  (a) The  connection  is  positive  if  exchange  in  one  relation  is 
contingent  on  exchange  in  the  other.  (b) The  connection  is  negative  if  ex- 
change in one relation is contingent on nonexchange in the other. 
The importance of an explicit theoretical treatment of the concept "con- 
nection" in any theory of social networks has not been fully recognized. 
That any two dyads, A-B and A-C, have one member in common (i.e., 
actor A) does not necessarily imply that these two relations are connected 
and thus represent a three-actor network. As a result, for exchange net- 
works, common membership is not sufficient as a "connecting principle." 
If the A-B  and A-C exchange relations are connected (by definition 1), 
they define the minimal network or component, B-A-C, of possibly larger 
structures, each  such  component  being  either positively  or negatively 
connected within itself. Larger network structures might therefore consist 
of purely positive connections, purely negative connections, or some mix- 
ture of both types. 
The distinction between negative and positive connections has signif- 
icant theoretical implications for network analysis which have yet to be 
fully developed.  For example,  the discussion thus far has said nothing 
about the social conditions producing one or the other type of connection. 
2 The  set  of  exchange  relations  is  properly  viewed  as  a  subset  of  exchange  opportunities. 
Members  of  an  exchange  relation  are  assumed  to  have  some  degree  of  "commitment"  to 
the  relation,  relative  to other  potential  alternatives  (see  Cook  and  Emerson  [1978]  regarding 
commitment). 
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Generally speaking, one expects that if B and C are alternative exchange 
partners for A,  in the sense that B and C are substitutable as sources, 
then the connection is negative.  Alternative sources thus introduce an 
element of negativity or competition (see Cook 1978) into the exchange 
system. Dating networks and friendship networks are typically negatively 
connected throughout. On the other hand, if a resource obtained from B 
is required by A for interaction with C (e.g.,  as when A is a broker), the 
connection at A is positive.  Large networks completely positive in form 
are probably very rare because of the frequent existence of alternative 
sources. "Mixed" structures, we  suspect,  are much more common.  For 
example,  exchange in the  Kula ring,  described by Malinowski  (1922), 
involves  a specific complex pattern including exchange  connections of 
both types (see Emerson 1981). Similarly, larger networks involving bro- 
kers typically entail both positively and negatively connected exchange 
relations. Marsden's (1982) simulation of "brokerage"  is a study of "mixed" 
networks.4 For both substantive  and analytical reasons,  we  begin our 
investigation  with  a  focus  on  purely negatively  connected  networks.5 
However, research concerning purely positively connected networks and 
mixed networks is currently under way. 
The concept "network connection" allows us to specify the boundaries 
of concrete networks and develop a theory in which events happening at 
any location in the network have  predictable repercussions within  the 
boundaries of the network. The concept of connection and the distinction 
between two basic types6 is one of the primary features distinguishing the 
I In  addition  to  specifying  the  conditions  under  which  different  types  of  connection  are 
likely  to  emerge,  it  is  theoretically  interesting  to  specify  the  mechanisms  which  alter  the 
nature  of  the  connection.  For  example,  a negative  connection  might  be  transformed  into  a 
positive  connection  through  "product  differentiation"  or some  other  type  of  resource  value 
differentiation.  Well-known  examples  of  these  types  of  processes  exist  in  economics  (e.g., 
product  differentiation)  and  sociology  (e.g.,  division  of  labor  or role  differentiation). 
4While  Marsden's  (1981a,  1981b,  1982)  work  is  based  on  Coleman's  model  of  exchange, 
the  particular  interest  and  control  structures  he  specifies  in  his  simulation  (Marsden  1981b) 
combine  to  produce  elements  of  both  positive  and  negative  connection  in  the  networks  he 
investigates. 
I The  exact  character  of the  connections  forming  natural  social  networks  must  be determined 
by  research  directed  to that  end.  That  is our  major  point  in introducing  the  concept.  Given 
the  difficulties  such  field  research  can  encounter,  it is essential  to  develop  theory  regarding 
network  connections.  Laboratory  research,  in  which  networks  connected  in  known  ways 
can  be  created  and  studied,  has  much  to  offer  in the  development  of  such  theory.  That  the 
networks  established  in  our  laboratory  resemble  in  exact  detail  no  "real"  network  should 
neither  surprise  nor bother  the  reader.  External  validity  is,  of course,  an important  concern. 
This  means  that  definitions  and  propositions  which  can  be  applied  both  inside  and  outside 
the laboratory  must  be developed  through  our efforts  at theory  construction.  We have  reason 
to  believe  that,  when  that  is  done,  laboratory  work  can  inform  field  research. 
6 In addition  to the  sign  of the  contingency  (positive  vs.  negative)  linking  exchange  relations, 
it is important  to  note  that  network  connections  can  vary  in  strength  We will  not  develop 
a quantitative  concept  of  connection  in  this  article 
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exchange approach to network structures from other theories or methods 
of network analysis.  While exchange networks have  empirically deter- 
mined boundaries,  often the  actors themselves  are not aware of those 
boundaries. For example, in a three-actor network, B-A-C, actors B and 
C  might  not  even  know  of  one  another. Similarly, A  might  have  no 
knowledge about possible network relations beyond or between B  and 
C.  This has important implications for the analysis of social structure. 
Frequently there are no consensually defined network boundaries, even 
though boundaries do exist. Thus, participation in a network typically is 
not  based  on  "membership status." Instead,  actors can  be  viewed  as 
relatively autonomous decision makers occupying "positions" in a struc- 
ture which frequently extends beyond their own awareness. 
Position in an Exchange Network 
For  simplicity, an  exchange  network can be represented as a digraph 
(see Harary et al.  1965; Berge 1962) or as a flow network (Harary et al. 
1965; Busacker and  Saatz  1965). Points in a network  graph represent 
individual or corporate actors; lines or edges represent exchange relations. 
We use the notion of "residual graph" from graph theory to specify what 
we mean by position in a network. A residual graph (or matrix) is obtained 
by the removal of a specified point from a parent graph. The use of this 
concept allows us to locate sets of actors (identified as points in the graph) 
who have structurally similar locations in a network. We refer to these 
actors as occupants of the  same position.  Thus,  we  define position in 
graph theory terms as follows: 
Definition 2: A position in a graph or network is a set of one or more points 
whose residual graphs are isomorphic. 
The concept "position"  is important for two reasons: (a) it helps simplify 
the analysis of  otherwise more complex networks,  and (b) it has been 
demonstrated to be an important determinant of behavior in exchange 
networks (see Cook and Emerson  1978). Figure  1 portrays some of the 
network structures studied in our laboratory. Letters identify network 
positions, and numerical subscripts represent individual actors as occu- 
pants of each position. 
In the networks shown in figure 1: (1) if each actor has a resource which 
the other actors value and each actor values all other actors' resources, 
(2) and if each line represents an opportunity to exchange these valued 
resources, (3) then the patterns of lines displayed in this figure can be 
considered exchange "opportunity structures." Any opportunity actually 
used will involve a mutually beneficial two-way transfer or exchange of 
resources. Within these opportunity structures, over time,  networks of 
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connected exchange relations emerge. In our laboratory research the ex- 
perimenter determines the opportunity structures shown in figure 1. The 
subjects in these network studies conduct exchanges within the constraints 
set by the opportunity structure, forming exchange relations and a net- 
work of exchange through their actions. In the particular structures dia- 
gramed  in  figure  1,  solid  lines  represent  more  profitable  exchange 
opportunities than broken lines (by a factor of three to one); thus some 
opportunities will be experienced as clearly more beneficial than others. 
The less favored opportunities should not lead to the formation of con- 
tinuing exchange relations. Therefore, the actual networks expected to 
emerge are those represented by the solid lines in figure 1. These emergent 
networks are negatively connected. If an actor has two solid-line oppor- 
tunities, the two partners represented are fully interchangeable as sources 
of benefit. With finite exchange time available, any use of one opportunity 
means that another opportunity is forgone. 
An important feature of our laboratory research is that the actors lo- 
cated in the structure have  no knowledge of the network beyond their 
own opportunity set. Thus in figure 1, positions A,  C, D2-D4, and E,- 
E8 are all identical from the occupants' viewpoint.  But, as positions in a 
network,  they differ from each other in one respect-the  nature of the 
remote structure they are embedded in, which transcends the occupants' 
knowledge. This feature allows us to examine "purely"  structural deter- 
I(a)  4  person  network  I (b)  4  person  network  I (c)  5  person  network 
(two  positions)  (one  position)  (three  positions) 
022 
B2  -  -B3  03  04 
F  -  -F2 
I(d)  7  person  network  I (e)  10  person  network  I (f)  13  person  network 
(t hree  positions)  (three  positions)  (three  positions) 
,F3  F6  ?-F7  ,--  F13> 
/F~~~~~~~~~~~  3  T6  7  R"  ,  F 
D  F8  D3  0F1  F15  D4  F18 
E4  E5\ 
'  77  E8  I  E  |  E 
F4-F  ---F  F16, 
F4  5  F, I  I F  -F5  F-  --  -  -F  F  9  II  ~~~  ~~~17  20 
FIG.  1.-Exchange  networks  studied  in  laboratory  experiments  and  computer  simula- 
tions.  (Positions  are identified  by letters,  occupants  by numerical  subscripts.  Lines  represent 
the  negotiated  exchange  of  24  points  [solid  lines]  or  eight  points  [dashed  lines].) 
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minants of behavior. In particular, the distribution of power can be stud- 
ied as a function of position in an opportunity structure. Furthermore, if 
we let the actual amount of resources exchanged in any given transaction 
be determined by negotiation, so that benefit, while mutual, is potentially 
unequal,  power  use  can  be  measured in  terms of  the  actual  benefits 
obtained through negotiation.7 
CENTRALITY  AND  POWER IN  NEGATIVELY  CONNECTED  EXCHANGE 
NETWORKS 
In a previous experiment (Cook and Emerson 1978) on the distribution 
of power in negatively connected exchange networks, the structures dia- 
gramed as figure la  and b were studied. The  results concerning power 
use demonstrated that power is a function of position in the network, 
even  when  the  position occupants  are ignorant of  the  actual network 
structure and their own position in it. More specifically, power was found 
to  be  concentrated in position A,  the  most  central position,  relatively 
absent in the peripheral position B (see fig.  la),  and evenly distributed 
across the occupants of position C (in the power-balanced network, fig. 
lb).8 The outcome of that experiment was predicted on the basis of simple 
power-dependence reasoning (i.e.,  A is less dependent than B and C, and 
C, are equally  dependent).  But  the  results could  have  been predicted 
parsimoniously on the basis of structural centrality, if power is hypoth- 
esized to be a function of centrality. Thus the question arises, Do  pre- 
dictions based on power-dependence notions and those based solely on 
structural centrality yield the same results in negatively connected net- 
works? We turn to two bodies of theory and an experiment to provide an 
answer. The network diagramed in figure Ic is the one analyzed in the 
actual experiment. Simulation results are presented for networks  id-f. 
In order to  examine the  generality of the  link between  centrality and 
power in negatively connected exchange networks, we moved to the anal- 
ysis of larger, more complex networks in which not all actors have direct 
access to one another and no actor enjoys simple monopoly power (as A 
does in fig.  la). 
I In  order  to  examine  power  use  we  removed  from  the  situation  factors  known  to  inhibit 
the  exercise  of power.  For example,  actors  in a network  were  not  informed  about  the  profits 
of  other  actors  in  the  network.  This  procedure  effectively  removes  the  operation  of  equity 
concerns  from  the  negotiations  (see  Cook  and  Emerson  1978). 
8The  comparison  between  these  two  networks  can  be  considered  an  empirical  comparison 
between  a "star" network  (fig.  la)  with  maximum  point  centrality  (i.e.,  one  clearly  dominant 
position)  and  an  "all-channel"  or completely  connected  network  (fig.  lb)  in  which  access  is 
equalized  across  the  network.  Marsden  (1981b)  would  refer  to  these  two  types  of  networks 
as  "restricted  access"  vs.  "open  access"  networks,  respectively,  with  "access"  referring  to 
access  to  highly  valued  resources. 
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Point Centrality 
Structural centrality is one of the most frequently discussed properties of 
networks.9 Freeman (1979) identified three major conceptions of point 
centrality, each associated with a different underlying measurement ap- 
proach: degree-based measures,  betweenness  measures,  and closeness- 
based measures. A degree-based measure (see Nieminen  1974; Freeman 
1979) is a count of the number of adjacencies for a point. As Freeman 
(1979,  p.  221) notes  in the  context of communication networks,  "The 
degree of a point is viewed  as an index of its potential communication 
activity." Betweenness measures are based on the "frequency with which 
a point falls between pairs of other points on the shortest paths [or geo- 
desics] connecting them" (Freeman 1979, p.  221). Points central in this 
respect exhibit potential for control, since according to Freeman (1979, 
p.  221), strategic location on paths linking pairs of points provides po- 
tential influence in communication networks through the "withholding or 
distorting of information in transition." Finally, closeness-based measures 
(e.g.,  Sabidussi 1966) give an index of the extent to which a particular 
point is "close"  to all other points. This is a distance measure that counts 
the number of edges or lines in the paths (or geodesics) linking two points. 
Centrality in this case is indexed by the "shortest"  distance score of one 
point to all others. Freeman (1979, p. 224) interprets this measure (or set 
of measures) as an indicator of the extent to which a point can "avoid 
the control potential of others." In the case of communication networks 
a "central"  point, being close to other points, is less dependent on inter- 
mediaries for relaying information. Freeman concludes his article by stat- 
ing that substantive  concerns must determine the appropriateness of a 
particular conception and measure of centrality. 
For some networks these three types of measures give the same results 
with respect to identification of the most central point. For example, all 
agree that the center of a "star"  configuration is most central (e.g.,  point 
A in fig.  la).  However,  in other types of networks there is marked de- 
parture from agreement in the assessment of point centrality. For example, 
even in the fairly simple networks in figure ic-f,  there is some variation 
in the predictions regarding point centrality. Closeness and betweenness 
measures consistently identify point D as the most central position. Thus 
an ordering of point or position centrality based on these two types of 
measures suggests: D >  E >  F in networks ic-f.  Different orderings can 
9 Two  general  centrality  notions  have  been  developed:  (a) "point  centrality"  or dominance 
and  (b) "graph  centrality."  We  will  consider  only  measures  of  point  centrality  since  we  are 
interested  primarily  in  the  comparison  of  positions  "Relative"  measures  of point  centrality 
will  allow  us  to  compare  results  across  networks  of  different  size.  Graph  centrality,  which 
gives  one  measure  of  the  degree  of  centralization  of  the  entire  network,  may  prove  useful 
for  other  purposes 
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occur when a degree-based measure, counting only adjacencies, is used. 
Degree-based measures suggest the following orderings of positions with 
respect to centrality in these same networks: (1) for networks lc and le, 
D  =  E  >  F;  (2) for  network  id,  D  >  E  >  F;  (3) for  network  lf, 
E >  D >  F.10 
The  major conceptual weakness  of this  measure is that it  is  highly 
localized: it takes into account only direct links,  not indirect effects or 
paths. Thus the other two measures are superior for our purposes because 
they take into account the total structure of the network by focusing on 
characteristics of the paths or geodesics which link all pairs of points in 
the graph. Since our primary interest is in centrality as a network-wide 
indicator of power, we set aside degree-based measures as theoretically 
inadequate for the task. That leaves closeness and betweenness measures 
as potentially useful conceptions of centrality in exchange networks. The 
virtue of these measures is that, unlike the dyadic conception of power- 
dependence theory, these measures of centrality incorporate the entire 
structure into the centrality score assigned to each position.  Thus  cen- 
trality is a theoretical direction worthy of close scrutiny in experiments 
on more complex networks (e.g.,  fig.  lc-f). 
Centrality has been defined as one of the most important characteristics 
of positions, not only in communication networks (see, e.g.,  Bavelas 1948, 
1950; Leavitt  1951; Shaw  1954,  1964; Mackenzie  1966) but also in so- 
ciometric networks (see, e.g., Moreno 1934, 1943) and interorganizational 
networks  (see,  e.g.,  Rogers  1974; Miller  1980; Mizruchi and  Bunting 
1981). Thus it is logical to examine its role in exchange networks. Interest 
in point centrality has been fueled partially by the empirical demonstration 
that power and influence seem to be a function of the centrality of one's 
position in a social system (see Hopkins  1964). For example,  Marsden 
and Laumann (1977, p. 217) state that "those persons at the center of the 
network,  on whom  the  more peripheral actors are dependent,  are the 
most powerful actors in the system." In other work (see Laumann and 
Pappi 1973, 1976), this finding is referred  to as the principle of "integrative 
centrality."  Marsden and Laumann (1977, p. 224) also note that "power 
as computed by the Coleman model reflects the relative centrality of an 
actor in a network of dependency relations."  The parallel use of the terms 
"centrality" and  "dependency" in the  work cited is  noteworthy. Their 
relation to one another is the basic focus of this theoretical section. 
If power is indeed a function of centrality, measured in terms of close- 
ness or betweenness,  then we  arrive at the following experimental hy- 
pothesis concerning  the link between power and centrality  in the negatively 
10 Centrality  scores  based  on  degree-,  betweenness-,  and  closeness-based  measures  can  be 
computed  easily  for each  network  position  in fig  lc  (see  Freeman  [1979]  for computations). 
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connected exchange network graphed in figure lc,  the object of the ex- 
periment reported here: 
Hypothesis  1: In the  network  portrayed  in figure  ic,  D  >  E, >  F, in power 
if  either  closeness  or  betweenness-based  measures  of  point  centrality  are 
used. 
This  same prediction holds for the networks diagramed in figure ld-f, 
tested in a series of simulation experiments reported below. 
We do not offer hypothesis  1 with theoretically based confidence. In- 
stead, we offer it because (a) structural principles are desirable in order 
to advance exchange network theory, (b) point centrality appears to be 
the best currently available  candidate because of its relation to power, 
and  (c) this  hypothesis  makes  explicit  the  predictions which  the  best 
measures of point centrality would make, if applied to the networks under 
study here.  Since we  are dealing  with  negatively  connected exchange 
networks (as in the previous experiment reported in Cook and Emerson 
[1978]), we  are especially interested in the general applicability of cen- 
trality notions to predictions concerning the locus of power in this type 
of network. It is important to note that many centrality measures were 
originally developed to apply to networks in which resources (or bits of 
information) flow  through intermediary points.  In  our negatively  con- 
nected networks, however, the flow of resources is between two adjacent 
actors (i.e.,  points) with  no  intermediary; that  is,  there is  a direct as 
opposed to an indirect exchange of resources. If point-centrality measures 
do not predict well in negatively connected networks, either centrality is 
not linked to power in such networks or these measures are limited to 
certain kinds of networks and we must specify more carefully the sub- 
stantive meaning of existing measures of centrality. Freeman (1979) con- 
curs. Such specification is necessary if we are to develop a more general 
theoretical conception  of  centrality which  accommodates  qualitatively 
different types of networks. 
POWER AND  DEPENDENCE 
While the relation between power and centrality is intuitively compelling, 
it  has  not  been  given  an  explicit  theoretical interpretation. As  a  step 
toward that end, we return to power-dependence theory. The following 
definitions are taken,  with  minor modifications, from Emerson (1962, 
1972): 
Definition  3:  In  any  dyadic  exchange  relation  Ax; B,  (where  A  and  B  are 
actors,  and  x and  y  are  resources  introduced  in exchange),  the  power  of A 
over B (PAB)  is the potential  of A to obtain  favorable  outcomes  at B's expense. 
Definition  4: The  dependence  (DAB)  of A on B in a dyadic  exchange  relation 
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(e.g.,  Ax; BO)  is  a joint  function  (1) varying  directly  with  the  value  of y  to 
A,  and  (2) varying  inversely  with  the  availability  of  y  to  A  from  alternate 
sources. 
On the basis of Emerson's arguments (1962, 1972), we assert the following 
fundamental relationship between power and dependence: PAB  =  DBA. 
Power-dependence  concepts deal with  the  distribution of power  be- 
tween two partners in a dyadic exchange relation; thus they are not well 
suited for analyzing the power distribution among positions in an extended 
network.  However,  in very simple networks of the sort studied in the 
laboratory, power-dependence analysis can be applied, one relation at a 
time (and only one relation at a time), across the network. The results of 
this analysis yield three unambiguous predictions concerning the locus of 
power in these  negatively  connected networks.  The  predictions are as 
follows: 
Hypothesis  2: As the exchange  process  proceeds  through  time,  the occupants 
of  position  E  will  display  more  power  use  than  the  occupants  of  positions 
F  and  D.  This  display  of  greater  power  use  will  take  two  forms:  (a)  an 
increase  over  time  in  the  amount  of  benefits  received  from  exchange  at 
position  E,  and,  as a result,  (b) a greater  absolute  level  of exchange  benefit 
obtained  by  the  occupant  of  position  E  by  the  final  exchange  phase. 
Hypothesis  3:  The  differential  power  use  of  E  over  F  will  be  displayed 
before  the  power  use  of  E  over  D  (since  the  latter  process  is,  in  theory, 
predicted  to  be  a result  of  E's  power  use  over  F). 
Hypothesis  4:  In  the  final  or  stable  phase  of  power  use,  the  occupants  of 
position  E  will  exert  equal  levels  of  power  over  the  occupants  of  positions 
F  and  D. 
According to these hypotheses,  the predicted ordering of positions with 
respect to power in these networks at equilibrium is E >  D  =  F, which 
contradicts the prediction based on point-centrality measures (hypothesis 
1). 
The  reasoning behind these predictions follows  directly from power- 
dependence principles and the concept, exchange connection, when they 
are applied to all of the dyadic relations in the network. First, in negatively 
connected networks,  any two lines joined at a point provide that point 
with "alternative sources" of value,  as stated in definition 4. Therefore, 
if the relative value of resources is held constant (as in our experiment),"I 
the structure of the network determines the relative dependencies through- 
out the network.  Second, while positions D and E have equal access to 
" By  "constant"  we  simply  mean  that  the  value  is  assumed  to  be  the  same  across  the 
conditions  in  our  experiment.  This  assumption  is  reasonable  since,  although  it  is  obvious 
that  values  vary  across  individuals,  if  subjects  are  assigned  randomly  to  network  positions 
as well  as experimental  conditions,  there  should  be  no  systematic  differences  by  condition. 
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resources, each having two valuable partners, their partners do not have 
equal exchange opportunities. In figure lc,  unlike D,  E, has one very 
dependent partner over  whom  he  or she has power  and from whom, 
therefore, he or she will obtain high benefits assuming that E, uses power 
in a "rational" way.  12  As a result, D's apparent power equality with E, 
(based on an equal number of alternatives) will be short lived, for D must 
compete with F, for access to E, and F, has no alternatives. Stated ana- 
lytically, F-E-D  is a negative connection or purely negative component, 
as are all the connections in these networks.  Thus,  D  (the occupant of 
the  central position) is  ultimately  as weak  as all of  the  F,  (peripheral 
actors), with  E, emerging as the most powerful. These predictions hold 
even when none of the actors has knowledge about the network beyond 
his own immediate partnerships. 
Reasoning from power-dependence theory can be carried still further. 
In definition 4, two variables govern dependence. One of these, the avail- 
ability of valued resources, operates through position when network struc- 
tures are involved,  resulting in a social structural determinant of power. 
That is, position in the network determines availability. The other vari- 
able governing dependence, the relative value of the resources introduced 
at various positions,  was  held constant in the above predictions. If re- 
source value is allowed to vary-as  it does in nature-then  it will confound 
the foregoing network structural determinants of power. However, if one 
varies resource value between networks while holding it constant (either 
high or low) within networks, still another hypothesis can be advanced. 
If the incentive to exchange is high (because the resources exchanged 
are highly valued) throughout the network, then position will create dif- 
ferentials in resource availability; the latter determine dependence and 
thus power. Predictions 2, 3, and 4 assume some incentive to exchange. 
In contrast, if the incentive to engage in exchange is uniformly low, no 
actor in the network will be very dependent on the others and the potential 
power inequalities will be reduced across the network regardless of posi- 
tion. Therefore, 
Hypothesis  5:  The  effects  implied  in  hypotheses  2,  3,  and  4  will  be  more 
12  This  assumption  is necessary  theoretically  since  it allows  us  to derive  testable  predictions 
concerning  manifest  power  from  principles  dealing  with  potential  power.  In our experimental 
setting,  by  "rational"  we  mean  that  each  actor  in  the  network  explores  alternative  sources 
of  benefit  in the  network  (a) through  extending  offers  to  others  and  (b) by  comparing  offers 
and  counteroffers  from  others.  Each  actor  maximizes  benefit  by  (a) accepting  the  better  of 
any  two  offers,  (b) lowering  offers  when  offers  go unaccepted,  and  (c) holding  out  for better 
offers  when  it  is  possible  to  do  so.  This  is  clearly  a testable  assumption,  but  all  one  could 
conclude  from  evidence  to  the  contrary  is  that  sometimes  subjects  in  our  laboratory  act 
"irrationally."  We  have  examined  empirically  some  of  the  conditions  under  which  these 
conditions  do  not  hold  (e.g.,  when  equity  concerns  are  operative;  see  Cook  and  Emerson 
[1978]). 
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pronounced  under  conditions  of  high  exchange  incentive  than  under  con- 
ditions  of  low  exchange  incentive. 
POWER AS POTENTIAL,  POWER USE,  AND  EQUILIBRIUM 
Power, in definition 3, is conceived as a potential for gaining increased 
benefit at the other's expense in a dyadic exchange relation. In applying 
this conception of power to networks of negatively connected exchange 
relations, we  have  seen  above  that the  structure helps  determine that 
potential for each position in the network,  but the occupants of these 
positions might use their power in varying degree or at a variable rate. 
If power is ever used to its theoretical limits, then, in our research setting, 
the  less  powerful  actor could  receive  no  more benefit from the  more 
powerful actor than is obtainable from the best alternative source. This 
would define the theoretical equilibrium point. 
Considering the structures in figure 1, if solid lines represent 24 units 
of profit to be divided through exchange and dashed lines represent only 
eight units of negotiable profit, then the best alternative source for all 
occupants of position F is fixed at four points (8/2). Thus, if power were 
exerted to  its  absolute  maximum  in  these  networks,  all  occupants  of 
position E would obtain 20 points per exchange, while all occupants of 
positions F and D would obtain four points per exchange when equilib- 
rium is reached (i.e.,  when the exchange ratios have stabilized). If there 
are restraints on the exercise of power (e.g.,  equity concerns or less than 
fully rational negotiation), equilibrium will be reached somewhere short 
of this maximally  "exploitive" exchange  ratio (see Cook and  Emerson 
1978). 
But regardless of the particular equilibrium point reached over time in 
any specific network, the rate at which power use approaches the equi- 
librium level will be a function of the relative availability of resources to 
the actors in the  network  (i.e.,  their relative dependencies).  This  is  a 
direct extension of power-dependence reasoning which can be investigated 
in  our laboratory. Let  us  develop  this  reasoning and  then  derive  hy- 
potheses to be examined in a series of sitnulation experiments conducted 
on networks  ic-f. 
What varies across these networks is not only the size of the network, 
but, more important, the relative availability over time of highly valued 
resources to the occupants of positions D and E,. Relative availability of 
resources from alternate sources determines relative  positional  depen- 
dence (see definition 4). Relative positional dependence across the network 
of connected exchange relations determines power as evident in the chain 
of reasoning developed above (e.g.,  hypotheses 2-4). As a function of F,'s 
dependence on E,, the relative availability to D of valued resources from 
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E declines over time (even though D  and E have  an equal number of 
alternate sources).13  Thus D's dependence on E, increases, with the result 
that E's power over D increases (since PED =  DDE).  The outcome of this 
process is a reduction of power at the "center" in these networks.  This 
chain of reasoning based on the rather cumbersome application of dyadic 
power-dependence notions and the concept of negative connection yields 
fairly clear predictions concerning the rate at which equilibrium is reached 
in the distribution of power in these exchange networks: 
Hypothesis  6:  E's use  of power  over  D will  emerge  more  slowly  in network 
ld  than  in  network  1c. 
This prediction is based on the fact that the increase in the number of 
alternatives for D in network ld increases the availability of resources to 
D and thus may result in an initial power advantage for D over E,  but 
the advantage will be eroded over time as predicted above,  because of 
the  decreasing availability  of  valued  resources from E.  This  decrease 
should occur later in network ld than in lc,  retarding somewhat E's rise 
to power in ld.  Furthermore, it can be predicted that: 
Hypothesis  7: E's use  of power  over  F will  emerge  more  quickly  in network 
if  than  in  le,  where  it will  emerge  more  quickly  than  in  id. 
This  prediction results from the decrease in dependence of E, on F, 
across these three networks.  The  dependence of F on El is not altered 
across these networks,  but E gains power over F to the extent that the 
resources F, has to offer are available from other sources (i.e.,  other F). 
In addition,  as  stated  in  hypothesis  3  above,  E, will  display  a power 
advantage over D based indirectly on El's power over F. Thus it follows 
from hypotheses 3 and 7 that, since E's power over F is emerging more 
rapidly across these networks, E's power over D should also emerge more 
rapidly. Therefore: 
Hypothesis  8: E's use  of power  over  D will  emerge  more  rapidly  in network 
if  than  in  le,  where  it  will  emerge  more  rapidly  than  in  id. 
An important point to be made is that treating number of alternatives 
as  a  perfect  indicator of  resource availability  can  result in  erroneous 
predictions when  applied  to  connected  sets  of  exchange  relations and 
suffers from the  same  deficiency as a simple degree-based measure of 
13 Various  theorists  (see  Blalock  and  Wilken  1981;  Marsden  1982)  treat  number  of  alter- 
natives  as the  main  determinant  of  dependence  (along  with  resource  value).  While  this  may 
seem  to  be  implied  by  Emerson's  (1962,  1972)  definition  of  dependence,  it  is  important  to 
note  that  the  operative  term  is  "resource  availability,"  which  only  under  certain  conditions 
translates  directly  into  number  of alternatives.  As  one  anonymous  reviewer  cleverly  stated, 
"It makes  no difference  how  many  bad  sources  of supply  a position  has." Thus  it is important 
to  distinguish  theoretically  between  resource  availability  and  the  number  of  resource  sup- 
pliers. 
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centrality. In theory, availability and number of alternatives must be kept 
analytically separate even  though  under certain conditions number of 
alternatives may completely determine availability (e.g.,  as in the case of 
a network in which there are no indirect paths).  14  Thus,  in network ld, 
for example, position E is predicted to emerge as more powerful than D 
over time, despite the fact that D has access to more alternative exchange 
partners and appears to occupy a more central location in the network. 
THEORETICAL  STRENGTHS  AND  DEFICIENCIES 
Before we turn to experimental results, deficiencies in both of the theo- 
retical approaches we have explicated should be noted. The issue before 
us  in  the  following  experiment is  not  which  approach makes  correct 
predictions in this case but, rather, how best to integrate network-struc- 
tural principles and power-dependence theory to explain the dynamics of 
power in exchange networks. The difficulty with power-dependence con- 
cepts, as they now stand (e.g.,  Emerson 1962, 1972), is that they are too 
closely bound to dyadic analysis. The reasoning behind hypotheses 2, 3, 
and 4 is complex as a result. Yet, within this limitation, power-dependence 
theory has the virtue of being closely coordinated with concrete behavioral 
concepts and observations. Furthermore, it offers an intuitively appealing 
theoretical interpretation of the notion of centrality. Marsden and Lau- 
mann (1977), and others, as noted above,  have attempted to relate de- 
pendency notions to power and centrality in networks. Power-dependency 
theory may help accomplish this task. 
In contrast, the approach to power through point centrality of positions 
has the virtue of taking the structure of an entire network into account 
in specifying at once a degree of centrality (and thus a power level) for 
every  position  in  that  structure.  Because  of  the  formal mathematical 
properties of  networks,  such  analysis  can be  applied to  very complex 
structures. But this approach is weak where the other one is strong. The 
link between centrality and power is largely intuitive; and the abstract 
graph-theoretic networks to which these centrality measures have been 
applied are only loosely coordinated with the social interactive networks 
they represent. For example, the concept of connection, which is so fun- 
damental in our substantive theory of networks,  to our knowledge has 
not been incorporated in any formal network model. As a result, previous 
approaches cannot make differential predictions concerning the locus of 
power in positively and negatively connected networks. Thus we did not 
14  For  example,  in  a  star  network  all  peripheral  actors  have  direct  access  to  one  and  only 
one  source  of  valued  resources.  Adding  more  peripheral  actors  to  the  network  simply 
increases  the number  of suppliers  to the central  actor; it does  not alter the relative  dependence 
of  those  on  the  periphery  (unless  there  is  a very  finite  supply  of  resources  at  the  center). 
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design the following study as a "critical"  test between two bodies of theory. 
Instead, we hoped to gain an empirical base for further theoretical de- 
velopment which  would  facilitate the integration of these two research 
traditions. 
THE  EXPERIMENT 
An  experiment was  designed  to  test  the  foregoing predictions derived 
from point-centrality and power-dependence notions. The experiment was 
conducted in a computerized laboratory, using methods described more 
fully in Cook and Emerson (1977,  1978). 
Briefly, subjects were recruited from undergraduate classes and campus 
newspaper ads.  Emphasis was placed on the desire to earn money as a 
motive for taking part in the experiment. After a brief collective orien- 
tation, each subject was taken to a private room containing a computer 
terminal. All terminals are joined to a minicomputer in the laboratory 
which is programmed to allow  certain terminals to communicate with 
certain other terminals. This procedure gives the experimenter control of 
the network of exchange opportunities. 
Within the opportunity structure set by the experimenter, subjects ne- 
gotiated with one another for "profit  points" by sending offers and coun- 
teroffers until trade agreements were reached. Each transaction involved 
the division of a constant sum of points (either 24 or eight as shown in 
fig. 1) between two bargaining partners in that transaction. However, the 
subjects did not know the constant sum and therefore could not compare 
their own  with  the  other's benefits. In this way  principles of "equity" 
were effectively prevented from operating in this laboratory setting. 
The total time of 81 minutes spent in the exchange process was divided 
into 27 transaction periods of 180 seconds each. Each person was allowed 
to complete only one transaction per period. Therefore, the network cre- 
ated in the laboratory was negatively connected: exchange in one relation 
was contingent on nonexchange in other relations during a given trans- 
action period. That is, the use of one exchange opportunity meant that 
other opportunities had to be forgone during that time period. 
Design Features 
The experimental design involved the following features: 
Network structure.-The  network shown in figure lc  was used. Five 
persons in one network were treated as one experimental case or data 
unit. 
Measurement of the dependent variable, power use.-In  each exchange 
relation in  the  network  (shown  as  a  solid line  in fig.  1), two  persons 
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negotiated over the division of 24 points convertible into dollars. The use 
of power of one person relative to the other is measured as the number 
of points obtained through negotiation. 
Incentive manipulation.-The  manipulation of exchange incentive was 
straightforward. Both  the  amount  of  fixed wages  the  subjects  would 
receive during the experimental session and the value of the profit points 
they could obtain by completing trade agreements were varied.  These 
conditions were operationalized as follows: (1) In the high-incentive con- 
dition, subjects were paid $0.25 per hour while each profit point obtained 
through exchange was  worth  2.5?.  As a result, most of their pay was 
derived through exchange.  (2) In the low-incentive  condition, the fixed 
wage for participation was $3.00  per hour and the value of each point 
was 0.5?.  Subjects in this condition therefore derived most of their pay 
through a fixed wage and were less dependent on making exchanges in 
order to derive pay. 
Design.-The  design of the experiment was a factorial type containing 
two between-subjects variables: (1) exchange incentive (high vs. low), and 
(2) subject gender (male vs. female). There was one within-subjects vari- 
able: trial blocks (there were 27 trials aggregated into three trial blocks 
each containing nine trials). Within each sex,  subjects were randomly 
assigned to experimental conditions including positions within networks. 
Five cases were included in each cell of the design (a case is a five-person 
group).  15 
Subjects.-A  total of 100 university students (50 male and 50 female) 




As a partial check on the exchange incentive manipulation, subjects were 
asked on the postexperimental questionnaire to indicate how important 
earning money through exchange was for them. The results of a two-way 
(sex x  incentive) analysis of variance on this item indicated a significant 
main effect for incentive (F =  8.17, df =  1,96, P <  .01). The means (X) 
15  Eight  subjects  were  scheduled  per  session  to  insure  that  the  subjects  would  not  discover 
the  identity  of  their  bargaining  partners.  The  extra  three  subjects,  randomly  selected  from 
the  eight,  participated  in  a three-person  replication  experiment.  The  orientations  for  both 
experiments  were  identical  and  the  computerized  system  allowed  us  to  run  more  than  one 
experiment  simultaneously.  The  subjects  knew  only  that  they  would  have  two  exchange 
partners  randomly  selected  from  the  seven  others  present  and  were  not  aware  that  two 
experiments  were  being  run.  Thus,  they  did  not  know  the  exact  size  of the  networks  or the 
nature  of  the  exchange  connections  among  the  remaining  participants. 
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indicated that the importance of earning money through exchange was 
greater for subjects in the high-incentive conditions than for those in the 
low-incentive conditons (X =  5.42 vs. X  =  4.52 on a seven-point scale 
where 7 represents extremely important). No  other effects were signifi- 
cant. 
Power and Network  Position 
If power is indeed a function of point centrality, then,  assuming actors 
use their power, the occupants of.position D should evidence more power 
use than the occupants of the more peripheral positions, E and F. How- 
ever, on the basis of power-dependence principles, we predicted in hy- 
pothesis 2 that occupants of position E would emerge as most powerful. 
Hypothesis 2 implies two findings: (a) a systematic increase over time in 
the amount of profit E is able to obtain in exchanges with both D and 
F, and (b) ability on the part of E to obtain better than half the total 
profit available per dyadic exchange with both D and F (i.e.,  E should 
be able to obtain significantly more than 12 points per exchange on the 
average since there are 24 points available for each exchange involving 
E).  16 Furthermore, hypothesis 5 predicts that these power differences will 
be more pronounced under conditions of high exchange incentive than 
under conditions of low incentive. 
The profit data for E's exchanges with both D and F in network ic 
under conditions of high and low  exchange incentive  are displayed in 
table  1. To test  the hypothesis that  E's profits from exchanges would 
increase over time, separate three-way analyses of variance (incentive  x 
sex  x  trial block) for designs containing a repeated measure were per- 
formed on the profit obtained by E in exchanges with both D and F. As 
implied by hypothesis 2a,  a significant main effect for trial blocks was 
obtained for the former (E's exchanges with D: F  =  3.34,  df  =  2,32, P 
<  .05) as well as the latter (E's exchanges with F: F  =  5.89,  df =  2,32, 
P <  .05). Inspection of the cell means in table 1 indicates that these effects 
were due to an increase in the profit received by E over time as predicted 
by hypothesis 2a. 
Hypothesis 5 implies that this increase in E's profits over time will be 
greater under conditions of high exchange incentive than low incentive. 
16  Since  we  are interested  primarily  in the effect  of network  position  on the exercise  of power, 
no  distinction  is  made  in  our  analyses  between  exchanges  involving  different  occupants  of 
the same  position.  The  data  for occupants  of identical  positions  were  averaged.  For example, 
the  profit  obtained  by  E in  exchanges  with  D  was  calculated  as the  average  profit  obtained 
by El and  E2 in all dyadic  exchanges  with  D.  Similarly,  the profit  obtained  by E in exchanges 
with  F  was  calculated  as  the  average  profit  of  El  and  E2 obtained  in  all  dyadic  exchanges 
with  F,  and  F2 
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In other words,  the interaction of incentive  and trial blocks should be 
significant. For E's exchanges with D,  this interaction effect was signif- 
icant (F  =  3.69,  df  =  2,32,  P  <  .05). Inspection of the trial means in 
table 1 indicates that this effect was due to the differential rate of profit 
increase over time in the two  incentive  conditions as predicted by hy- 
pothesis 5.  For E's exchanges with F, however, the interaction was not 
significant.17  Thus  hypothesis 5 received support in the case of E's ex- 
changes with D but not with F. 
Since the emergence of power use is expected to occur over time, only 
data from the last trial block were used to test hypothesis 2b. As predicted 
by this  hypothesis,  E's profits in  exchanges with  D  were significantly 
greater  than  12 (X  =  15.26,  t  =  2.75,  df  =  19, P  <  .01,  one-tailed  test). 
Similarly, E was also able to obtain significantly greater than 12 points 
in exchanges  with  F (X  =  16.18,  t  =  6.46,  df  =  19, P  <  .01,  one-tailed 
test). Thus,  hypothesis 2b received clear support. 
Hypothesis 5 implies that the profits received by E should be greater 
under conditions of high incentive than low incentive in exchanges with 
TABLE  1 
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS: 
MEAN PROFIT OF PERSON E  PER EXCHANGE WITH D  AND WITH F 
in NETWORK 1C BY EXCHANGE INCENTIVE AND TRIAL BLOCK 
EXCHANGE  TRIAL  BLOCKS 
INCENTIVE  AND 
EXCHANGE  PARTNER  1  2  3 
Low: 
D  ...........  13.80  12.69  13.32 
(4.13)  (4.26)  (4.25) 
F ............  13.27  14.78*  15.44** 
(3.10)  (2.77)  (2.96) 
High: 
D  ...........  12.90  13.72  17.19** 
(3.71)  (4.40)  (5.26) 
F ............  15.52**  16.66**  16.91** 
(2.38)  (2.10)  (2.46) 
Combined: 
D  ...........  13.35  13.21  15.26** 
(3.95)  (4.36)  (5.16) 
F ............  14.40**  15.72**  16.18** 
(2.99)  (2.63)  (2.82) 
NOTE  -The  profit  obtained  by  D  and  F  in  negotiations  with  E  can  be  obtained  by  sub- 
tracting  the  values  in  this  table  (E's  profit)  from  24  Standard  deviations  are  in  parentheses 
*  Significantly  greater  than  12  (P  <  05) 
**  Significantly  greater  than  12  (P  <  01) 
17  This  result  may  be  due  to  a "ceiling"  effect.  The  exchange  rate  seems  to  stabilize  in  the 
high-incentive  condition  at about  16 to eight  by  trial  block  2,  approaching  but  not  reaching 
its  theoretical  maximum.  This  same  rate  of  exchange  was  also  approached  in  the  low- 
incentive  condition  but  stabilized  later  (i.e.,  in  the  third  trial  block). 
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both D and F. To test this aspect of the hypothesis, E's profits in the low- 
incentive condition were compared with E's profits in the high-incentive 
condition.  For E's exchanges with D,  this difference was  significant (X 
=  3.87,  t  =  1.72, df =  18, P  <  .05, one-tailed test). However, for E's 
exchanges with F, the difference was not significant (X =  1.47, t =  1.15, 
df =  18, N.S.).  Once again,  hypothesis 5 was supported for exchanges 
with D but not with F (see n.  17). 
Differential Emergence of Power Use over Time 
Hypothesis 3 predicted that the power use of E over F (the most peripheral 
position) would be displayed first, followed by the emergence of power 
use by E over D (the most central position), because occupants of position 
F are more dependent initially than the occupants of position D.  To test 
this hypothesis, a difference score was computed by subtracting the points 
obtained by  E in  exchanges  with  F  from the points obtained by E in 
exchanges with D for the first trial block. A t-test for correlated means 
indicated that this difference was not significant (X =  1.04, t =  1. 17, df 
=  19, N.S.,  one-tailed test). However,  by the second trial block, when 
power use had begun to emerge, the difference was significant (X =  2.51, 
t  =  3.19,  df  =  19, P  <  .01,  one-tailed test).  Thus  hypothesis 3 was 
supported. (This hypothesis makes no claim about when power use will 
emerge; it claims only that it will emerge earlier in exchanges with F than 
in those with D.) 
Hypothesis 5 implies that the differential emergence of power use of E 
over F and D predicted in hypothesis 3 will occur earlier under conditions 
of high exchange incentive  than under conditions of low  incentive.  To 
test this hypothesis, a difference of differences score was calculated (i.e. 
[ProfitEF  -  ProfitED]H  -  [ProfitEF -  ProfitED]L,  where the first difference 
is obtained from the high-incentive condition and the latter from the low- 
incentive condition). For the first trial block this score was significant (X 
3.14, t =  1.88, df =  18, P <  .05, one-tailed test); it was not significant 
for the second trial block (X =  0.84,  t  =  0.52,  df  =  18, N.S.).  This 
finding suggests that the differential in power use by E over F relative 
to  E's use  of  power  over  D  emerged earlier under conditions of  high 
incentive than under low-incentive  conditions as implied by hypothesis 
5. 
Equal Powerlessness of the Central and Peripheral Positions 
Hypothesis 4 predicted that, in the final phases of the exchange process, 
occupants of the most powerful position, E, would be exercising an equal 
amount of power use over both D and F. This implies that the profits E 
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obtains from D will not be significantly different from those E obtains 
from F in the final trial block. The hypothesis assumes, however, that 
the exchange process has stabilized. As a check on this assumption, E's 
profits for the first and second halves of the final trial block were com- 
pared. If the exchange process has stabilized by the last trial block, there 
should be no significant difference between  E's profits in the first and 
second halves of this final exchange phase.  For the high-incentive con- 
dition, this was true (F =  0.01, df =  1,16, N. S.). However, the difference 
was close to significant in the condition of low exchange incentive (F  = 
3.80,  df  =  1,16, P  <  .07). This  suggests that under conditions of low 
incentive,  the exchange process may not yet have stabilized; hence we 
shall test hypothesis 4 only for the high-incentive condition. A t-test for 
correlated means revealed no significant difference between the amount 
of profit E received in exchanges with D and that received in exchanges 
with  F  in  the  high-incentive  condition  (X  =  0.28,  t  =  0.19,  df  =  18, 
N.S.);  the test confirms hypothesis 4. 
Hypothesis 5 implies in addition that the equality in the level of E's 
use of power over D vs. F will emerge more quickly under conditions of 
high than of low incentive.  To test this implication,  E's profit from ex- 
changes with D  versus F under high incentive was compared with  E's 
exchange profits from D versus F under low incentive.  This "difference 
of  differences" approached  significance,  indicating  that  the  predicted 
equality of power use by E over D versus F (i.e.,  hypothesis 4) tended 
to be achieved earlier under the condition of high exchange incentive (t 
=  1.38, df =  18, P  <  . 10, one-tailed) than under that of low exchange 
incentive. 
These results taken together provide strong support for the basic pre- 
dictions derived from power-dependence reasoning concerning the dis- 
tribution of power over time in negatively connected exchange networks. 
All of the primary hypotheses (i.e.,  hypotheses 2-4) were supported. Hy- 
pothesis 5, concerning the effects of differential levels of exchange incen- 
tive, was partially  supported. In general, the effects predicted  in hypotheses 
2-4 were stronger under conditions of high exchange incentive than under 
those of low exchange incentive. Even when the predicted differences did 
not obtain (e.g.,  for hypothesis 2), the results suggest that the effect of 
low exchange incentive was to delay E's use of power over D,  whereas 
F's dependence was  so great that the exchange incentive  made no dif- 
ference in the emergence of E's use of power over F (see table  1). The 
emergence of E's power over D is, in theory, predicted to occur subsequent 
to the emergence of power over F (see results for hypothesis 3). Thus, 
E's power differential over D may not have had sufficient time to emerge 
in the  low-incentive  condition  before the  end  of  the  experiment.  The 
findings concerning the lack of stabilization (see hypothesis 4 results) of 
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the  exchange process during the  final trial block  under low  incentive 
further support this contention. 
COMPUTER  SIMULATION OF MORE COMPLEX  EXCHANGE  NETWORKS 
Having demonstrated empirically the predictive power of power-depen- 
dence theory within network lc,  we turn now to predicted differences in 
power use among the networks in figure ic-f.  Hypotheses  6,  7, and 8 
present these predictions. Because laboratory experiments with such large 
networks are too costly to conduct, we developed a computer simulation 
to "test" these hypotheses.  Because  hypotheses  1-4  apply to all of the 
more complex networks as well as to network lc,  the generality of those 
predictions was also explored in the simulation. 
A program (labeled SIMNET)  was written to simulate the negotiation 
of exchange among actors in any negatively connected N-actor network.  18 
The program has the capacity to vary the size and "shape"  of the network, 
the number of trials, the amount of profit available for various exchange 
relations, the number of offers and counteroffers permitted within a given 
trial, and the "toughness" of the simulated actors (i.e.,  their tendency to 
drive relatively  hard bargains).  For consistency  with  the  assumptions 
underlying power-dependence  theory,  the  simulated  actors  were  pro- 
grammed to act "rationally,"  that is, to attempt to maximize their profits 
through the  exchange  process.  As  in  the  theory presented above,  the 
"power" of these simulated "actors" can derive only from their location 
in the network, which links them to identically programmed other "ac- 
tors." 
"Rationality" in this bargaining program means specifically that each 
actor: (1) accepts the better of any two offers, (2) raises "its" demand the 
next time if its offer has been accepted, and (3) lowers its demand when 
an offer goes unaccepted. When an actor receives an offer which is greater 
than the one it is currently seeking,  the actor increases its demand the 
next time; it decreases its demand when the incoming offers are lower 
than its own past demands. The initial offers (or demands) sent out by 
the simulated "actors" at the beginning of the first trial were randomly 
assigned within  the range of  1-23.  Initial offers of 0 and 24 were not 
allowed, nor were negative demands. The initial offer was sent to all the 
exchange partners for any given actor. At the beginning of subsequent 
trials, the initial demand of each actor was increased if an exchange had 
been completed on the previous trial or decreased if the actor had failed 
to complete an exchange on that trial. 
18  The  simulation  program  was  written  in  FORTRAN  on  a  PRIME  300  mini-computer  by 
one  of  the  authors,  Toshio  Yamagishi.  Details  concerning  the  program  can  be  obtained  by 
writing  this  author. 
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To test  our predictions,  we  simulated the  5-,  7-,  10-,  and  13-actor 
networks in figure ic-f.  The number of transaction periods, or trials, was 
twice that used in the experiment, or 54 trials, to allow us to examine 
any trends which  might be produced over a longer period of time.  For 
each network structure, 50 replications were conducted, so that N  =  50. 
We present the results in table 2, which shows the average points obtained 
by E; from Fj and D in each network structure across six trial blocks of 
nine trials each. 
Simulation Results 
Simulation results can be examined in two ways: (a) for evidence that the 
simulation program is realistic, and, if there is such evidence, (b)  as "data" 
to support or contradict our hypotheses. 
a) Simulation of the five-person network in figure lc  allows a direct 
comparison with the results obtained from human subjects. The  simu- 
TABLE  2 
SIMULATION  RESULTS: 
MEAN  PROFIT  OF  THE  POWERFUL  (E)  PER  "EXCHANGE"  WITH  D  AND  WITH  F  IN 
FOUR  REPLICATIONS  VARYING  NETWORK  SIZE 
FIGURE  PART,  SIZE  OF  TRIAL  BLOCKS 
NETWORK,  AND E's 
EXCHANGE  PARTNER  1  2  3  4  5  6 
ic,  5  actor: 
D  ...........  12.79a  15.36  17.15  18.60  19.31  19.55 
(2.57)  (2.76)  (2.98)  (2.11)  (1.67)  (1.44) 
F ...........  14.71  16.33  17.83  19.08  19.86  19.91a 
(2.64)  (2.76)  (2.56)  (1.86)  (1.42)  (1.26) 
ld,  7 actor: 
D ...........  10.56b  13.03  15.00  16.54  17.64  18.47 
(3.02)  (3.07)  (2.81)  (2.32)  (1.68)  (1.43) 
F ...........  14.33  15.31  16.64  17.79  18.66  19.06 
(2.95)  (2.34)  (2.40)  (1.93)  (1.38)  (.97) 
le,  10 actor: 
D  ...........  13.99  17.69  19.65  20.06  20.11  20.11 
(2.89)  (2.37)  (1.07)  (.58)  (.55)  (.54) 
F ...........  16.35  18.68  19.86  20.11  20.22  20.01 
(2.16)  (1.35)  (.59)  (.42)  (.43)  (.39) 
lf,  13 actor: 
D ...........  14.50a  19.56c  20.42  20.63  20.50  20.43 
(3.18)  (2.10)  (.86)  (.66)  (.64)  (.55) 
F ...........  17.18  20.06  20.67  20.87  20.69  20.58 
(1.69)  (.74)  (.57)  (.59)  (.52)  (.49) 
NOTE.-These  values  represent the average profit E obtained in "exchanges" with D  and F, with 24 units of profit 
available for each "exchange"; therefore D's and F's average profit equals 24  -  E's profit in each case. Each trial block 
contained nine trials. Cell values are based on the simulation of 50 groups; in an occasional group, however, E did not 
complete an "exchange" in a given trial block.  Cell means labeled "a" are based on 49 groups, that labeled "b" has 47 
groups, that labeled "c" has 42 groups per cell; all others have 50 groups per cell. St'ndard deviations are in parentheses. 
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lation results in table  2 reproduced the entire pattern of experimental 
results in the high-incentive condition. (The low-incentive condition was 
not simulated.) Hypotheses  2, 3,  and 4 are supported both by real and 
by simulated subjects. These parallel findings can be used to infer both 
the "rationality"  of our real subjects and the "realism" of SIMNET. 
b) An examination of table 2 shows that all of the relevant hypotheses 
advanced through the application of power-dependence theory were sup- 
ported by  the  simulation  results.  Specifically, the  power  of  E  over D 
emerged more slowly in network  id  than in  ic  where D had fewer al- 
ternatives, as predicted by hypothesis 6. However, when the number of 
alternatives for D is constant, the rate at which equilibrium occurs de- 
pends on the number of alternatives for E, as indicated by hypothesis 8 
and supported by the  data  in  table  2 for the  relevant networks  id-f. 
Similarly, as predicted by hypothesis 7, the power of E over F emerged 
more quickly as the number of E's alternatives increased (networks ld- 
J). Thus,  while D and F, are shown to be equally powerless in the long 
run, the rate at which this equilibrium condition was achieved differed 
systematically as specified by hypotheses 6-8. 
DISCUSSION:  POWER,  DEPENDENCE,  AND  CENTRALITY 
The findings obtained both from human subjects in a simple network 
(fig. lc) and from the simulation of more complex networks demonstrate 
clear support for the predictions based on power-dependence theory. In 
contrast, two of the best conventional measures of point centrality (close- 
ness and betweenness) fail to generate sound predictions concerning the 
distribution of power in negatively connected exchange networks. As a 
result of these findings, we arrive at two major conclusions. First, if we 
are to retain the intuitively appealing notion that power is a function of 
centrality, we must either develop a more general conception of centrality 
or apply  current measures of  point  centrality only  in  certain types of 
networks. 19  For reasons of theoretical parsimony and generality, the for- 
mer strategy is  preferred. Second,  while  we  have  shown  that  power- 
dependence theory provides a very good basis for predicting the distri- 
bution of power in these networks, the theory was originally formulated 
at a very micro level ill-suited to the analysis of complex network struc- 
tures. Therefore, power-dependence theory needs to be raised, if possible, 
to a more macroscopic level of analysis. 
19  One  solution  is  to  specify  theoretically  the  conditions  under  which  different  measures  of 
centrality  apply.  Freeman  (1979)  has  begun  this  task.  However,  the  logical  conclusion  to 
such  efforts  might  well  be  the  increased  proliferation  of  centrality  measures  For  the  sake 
of  parsimony,  it would  be  preferable  to  develop  more  general  conceptions  and  measures  of 
centrality 
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Power-dependence theory (Emerson 1962,  1972) examines the power 
of one actor over another on the basis of the dependence of the latter. It 
is therefore fundamentally dyadic.  What is needed is the determination 
of power at a position within a structure, on the basis of the "dependence" 
of the entire structure on that position. We suggest (a) that a measure of 
such system-wide  dependence on a given  position in the network will 
turn out to be a measure of the "centrality" of that location and (b) that 
power  at  this  location  can  be  interpreted easily  in  power-dependence 
terms. Furthermore, we suggest that such a dependency-based concept 
of centrality may be general, applying across all types of exchange net- 
works, whether negatively connected, positively connected, or mixed. In 
this section of the discussion we can only point out the basic features of 
this approach, leaving a complete formulation for later work. 
Dependence and Network Vulnerability 
We start with this basic question: to what extent does the flow of valued 
resources (information, economic goods, political patronage, etc.) within 
an  N-actor  network  depend  on  facilitating  exchange  behavior  by  the 
occupants of a given position in that network? Stated differently, to what 
extent will reduced participation or exchange activity at a given location 
have detrimental consequences for exchange throughout the network? 
Our first step  toward  a  theoretical  solution  to  such  questions  was 
prompted by the graph-theoretic concept of "vulnerability"-the  vulner- 
ability of the network (or graph) to the removal of a given point or line 
(Harary et al.  1965). By "removal" we mean substantively any form of 
withdrawal from exchange activity. To remove a point (Pi) from a graph 
(G) is to obtain a subgraph called a "residual graph" (RGi). Compared 
with the parent graph (G), the structure of the residual graph (RGi)  might 
be "weakened" or impaired in terms of resource flow, in which case the 
parent graph G is said to be "point vulnerable" at Pi. We suggest here 
that the contribution of Pi to the network G and the "dependence" of 
exchange in that network on Pi can be studied by comparisons between 
G and RGi. Since we  have  defined a position as a set of points whose 
residual graphs are isomorphic, there need only be as many G and RG 
comparisons as there are positions in the network structure (i.e.,  residual 
graphs for points occupying the same position in a network are identical). 
These  comparisons will  provide a measure of the "dependence" of the 
network as a whole on each position therein. 
While a large number of more or less complex and refined measures 
can be derived from comparison of a graph with its residual graphs, one 
simple  measure using  the  network  in  figure lc  (reproduced below  for 
convenience) will serve to illustrate. 
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With this network taken as graph G, the three residual graphs shown 
in figure 2 are formed by the removal of points from positions D, E, and 
F, respectively. In our experiment, 24 resource units were exchangeable 
along solid lines and eight units along broken lines. From that information 
we can calculate what we refer to as the Reduction in Maximum Flow 
(RMF) in the total  network which  would  result if a given  point were 
removed. The results are shown in table 3. By this measure our laboratory 
network appears to be vulnerable only at position E, the position shown 
to be most powerful both in the actual experiment and in the simulation 
findings. 
Vulnerability in a negatively connected network locates the points of 
minimum dependence, equivalent to maximum network-wide power. Even 
though in these networks there are no "indirect" paths of resource flow 
D 
EE2 
F,  --  F2 
FIG.  iC.-Five-person  network (three positions) 
E2 
F1  -  F2 
RGd  RG6  R  Gf 
(Point  D Removed)  (Point  Ei  Removed)  (Point  Fi  Removed) 
FIG.  2.-Residual  graphs formed bv the removal of points from positions D,  E, and F 
respectivelv in network  Ilc  (graph G). 
TABLE  3 
REDUCED  MAXIMUM  FLOW  AS  A  MEASURE  OF  NETWORK  VULNERABILITY 
AT  EACH  POSITION  IN  THE  EXPERIMENTAL  NETWORK  IC 
Graph  G  RGd  RGe  RGf 
Maximum flow rate*  ............  48  48  32  48 
Reduced maximum flow (RMF) ..  ...  0  16  0 
*  Maximum  resources  exchangeable  in  the  network  per  transaction  period. 
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as there would be in a positively connected network, the volume of re- 
source flow within exchange relations is dictated both by accessibility to 
exchange partners and by the availability of resources from those partners. 
Thus positions are relatively "powerless"  in a network (e.g., D in network 
lc)  to the extent that they have  few  exchange opportunities (i.e.,  few 
alternative sources of valued resources) and have direct connections only 
to actors who have highly reliable alternative sources of supply. In any 
network of exchange, availability of resources from exchange partners is 
critically determined by the nature of their connections to other sources 
of benefit. Thus while there are no indirect paths of resource flow (e.  g., 
indirect exchange) in negatively  connected networks,  there are indirect 
effects of  the  structure of  the  alternative exchange opportunities,  and 
these effects have repercussions throughout the network. These are struc- 
tural implications of the nature of the exchange connections.  It is im- 
portant to note that the overall structure determines the distribution of 
power in negatively connected networks which do not involve  resource 
flows across the entire network. The distribution of benefit, however, is 
dictated by the distribution of  power even  though the  actors have  no 
awareness  of  the  total  potential  benefit to  be  obtained  in  the  system 
through exchange activity.20 
We have developed only a first approximation of a general measure of 
network-wide dependence on a given actor (or point).21  This discussion 
is meant only to illustrate the theoretical potential of a "vulnerability" 
approach to  the  problem  of  raising power-dependence  theory from  a 
dyadic to a more macrostructural level of analysis. At a minimum this 
conception achieves  identification of  the  centrally located  positions  in 
networks which are negatively connected. 
System-Level Dependence and Centrality 
This conception of vulnerability can also be seen as a useful approach to 
the measurement of point centrality in an exchange network that is sen- 
sitive to the nature of the connections that join dyads into networks. If 
the networks depicted in figure lc  and e,  for example,  were positively 
connected at E1  (i.e., if E,-F, exchange were contingent on E1-D  exchange), 
the removal of D would greatly reduce the network capacity for resource 
20  Since  the  actors  do  not  have  knowledge  of  the  total  potential  gain  possible  through 
exchange  activity,  the  exercise  of power  by any  actor  in the  structure  is a function  of position 
in the  network  and  not  of  any  direct  knowledge  or awareness  of  his  potential  to thwart  the 
"efficient"  (or  maximizing)  distribution  of  resources  across  the  network. 
21  The  RMF  measure  requires  modification  if it is to  be  applied  to  digraphs  (see  Yamagishi 
1981). 
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flow22  (i.e., D is a point of vulnerability in this network). For E, to continue 
to receive resources of value from F, in the network,  E, would become 
dependent on D  to maintain the flow of these resources to position E. 
Thus resource flow in the network as a whole would be highly dependent 
on D,  returning power to the "center" in this positively connected net- 
work. 
A "betweenness" measure of point centrality in positively  connected 
networks is  consistent  with  this  vulnerability notion  (as a  measure of 
network-wide dependence on a point). As Freeman (1979) notes, what is 
at issue theoretically in communication networks is the potential for con- 
trol through "withholding or distorting information." By  extension  to 
positively connected exchange networks, this concept would refer to the 
potential control over the rate of resource flow (i.e., through the potential 
to withhold resources or the failure to transmit them to other exchange 
partners in the network). While space will not allow a complete analysis 
of positively  connected networks here,  it does appear that the general 
notion of "vulnerability" can be adapted to positively connected as well 
as negatively  connected  networks (and,  by implication,  to  mixed net- 
works). What is interesting is that dependence and centrality clearly con- 
verge in this theoretical approach, as the choice of wording by Marsden 
and Laumann (1977, p.  224) would  suggest.  Further theoretical devel- 
opment and an experiment on positively connected networks are now in 
progress. 
CONCLUSIONS 
In this article we  have  dealt  primarily with  negatively  connected net- 
works, in an extension of previous research on the distribution of power 
in such networks. Our empirical research suggests that a very interesting 
structural principle applies to exchange networks of this type. It can be 
referred to as a "decentralization" principle: such networks tend to form 
into systems organized around multiple foci of power at the points E, in 
figure 1. Those points can be viewed as "regional centers" of power, like 
petty kingdoms in an encompassing empire (see Emerson  1982). Those 
points are defined as "central" if centrality is measured in terms of net- 
work-wide  vulnerability  at point P, (e.g.,  by a measure like  the RMF 
measure developed here). But such points cannot be considered "central" 
in any sense of the term by any of the existing measures of point centrality 
without falling into circular reasoning concerning the relation of power 
to centrality. 
22  In a network  of direct  exchange  relations  like  the  one  in fig.  la,  the  removal  of the  central 
point  (e  g.,  A) completely  halts  profitable  exchange  activity,  since  the actors  on the periphery 
cannot  engage  in  a profitable  exchange  of  resources. 
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Thus our research has identified a major weakness in existing point- 
centrality measures: they are not applicable to negatively connected ex- 
change networks. To fill this gap, we developed a measure based on the 
concept of vulnerability, network-wide dependence on a particular point. 
More important,  we  have  suggested  that  this  general notion  may  be 
developed  to  apply  to  positively  connected networks as  well,  since in 
networks of this type vulnerability seems to correspond to the underlying 
theoretical  meaning  of  betweenness-based  measures of point centrality 
(see Freeman  1979). Thus,  it is reasonable to expect that in positively 
connected networks, "centralization"  (i.e.,  a power shift to the center) is 
more likely to occur than decentralization because of the network-wide 
dependence on point D (if the connections are defined as positive instead 
of negative in fig.  ic-I).  Position D in such networks serves as the only 
resource link among the various peripheral subsystems of exchange ac- 
tivity (e.g.,  E,-F,). 
These notions are being developed further in order to specify theoret- 
ically the implications of the different types of exchange connections. It 
is clear that the integration of structural network principles with exchange 
network theory provides useful insights into the dynamics of power in 
networks of connected exchange relations. This type of theoretical activity 
will not only extend exchange theory but also provide one potential the- 
oretical basis for network theory (see Cook 1982). Finally, this theoretical 
formulation offers an explicit procedure for linking actors' exchange be- 
havior to network properties  (Foster 1979) and suggests mechanisms which 
may yield  "possible transformations" of  these  networks  as  a result of 
power dynamics or changes in the nature of the exchange connections. 
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